In the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935, the United States created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which ensured deposits in commercial banks up to $5,000. Congress capped the size of insured deposits so that small depositors would not run on banks, but large and informed depositors -such as firms and investors -would continue to monitor banks' behavior. This essay asks how that insurance scheme influenced depositors' reactions to news about the health of the economy and information on bank's balance sheets. An answer arises from our treatment-andcontrol estimation strategy. When deposit insurance was created, banks with New York state charters accepted regular and preferred deposits. Preferred depositors received low, fixed interest rates, but when banks failed, received priority in repayment. Deposit-insurance legislation diminished differences between preferred and regular deposits by capping interest rates and protecting regular depositors from losses. We find that before deposit insurance, regular depositors reacted more to news about banks' balance sheets and economic aggregates; while preferred depositors reacted less. After deposit insurance, this difference diminished, but did not disappear. The change in the behavior of one group relative to the other indicates that deposit insurance reduced depositor monitoring, although the continued reaction of depositors to some information suggests that, as intended, the legislation did not entirely eliminate depositor monitoring.
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Introduction
Deposit insurance is a pillar of financial architecture in modern economies, yet the policy remains controversial. Advocates assert that deposit insurance fosters financial stability and forestalls financial panics (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002; Folkerts-Landau and Lindgren, 1998; Garcia, 1999) . Critics claim that deposit insurance distorts incentives of savers and financiers, encourages moral hazard and excessive risk-taking, and spawns systemic financial crises. The controversy revolves around different perceptions about whether depositors monitor banks' performance in the absence of insurance; how monitoring influences banks' behavior; how, when, and to what extent insurance distorts monitoring; and whether it is possible to design a deposit insurance system that preserves (at least to some extent) depositor monitoring (Calomiris, 1999; Gorton, 2007) . Empirical studies examining the effect of deposit insurance on depositor monitoring have produced mixed results. Some studies detect monitoring, even in nations with explicit and extensive insurance (e.g. Park and Peristiani (1998) and Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) ). Other studies find little monitoring Huizinga 2004, Calomiris and Jaremski, 2016) .
These empirical inconsistencies arise for several reasons. Scholars study different nations with different insurance systems which may, in fact, function differently. Scholars often lack direct data on the phenomenon of interest; and scholars often study data from periods that lack clearly defined control and treatment groups. So, in many cases, scholars may not be able to precisely determine the ways in which depositors behaved. Recent studies overcome these identification issues by using more granular data. Some studies overcome these constraints by using a quasi-experimental research design, where they observe changes in the behavior of a newly insured group relative to an uninsured control group (Karas, Pyle, and Schoors, 2013;  2 Calomiris and Jaremski, 2016) . Others use the depositor-level data and observe the responses of individual depositors to shocks (Kelly and O'Grada, 2008; Iyer and Puri, 2012; Iyer, Puri, and Ryan, 2016; Brown, Guin, and Morkoetter, 2017) . In particular, Iyer, Jensen, Johannesen, and Sheridan (2017) use the depositor level data and document the reactions of individual depositors when the deposit insurance limit changed. Our essay examines a similar policy experiment: the creation of a national deposit insurance system in the United States during the 1930s.
The structure of New York's commercial banking system provides a unique analytic opportunity. New York's commercial banks accepted preferred and regular deposits. Preferred depositors received interest fixed by law, and when a bank failed, received repayment before regular depositors. Regular depositors received interest set by the market, which usually exceeded that paid to preferred depositors, but when a bank failed, received repayment after preferred depositors. During the 1930s, a series of federal laws (particularly the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935) limited interest that banks could pay upon demand deposits and established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The FDIC insured deposits in commercial banks up to $5,000. Before these reforms, the incentives of preferred and regular depositors differed sharply. For preferred depositors, regulations fixed the risks and returns at a low level; while for regular depositors, the market set the risks and returns at a higher level. After these reforms, regulations dictated risks and returns for both groups, setting the risk of loss for all depositors near zero and capping interest on deposits at a low rate (zero for demand deposits). This change in the incentives of one group relative to another facilitates our treatment-and-control estimation of the impact of deposit insurance. 1 1 Our dataset focuses on the period between 1929 and 1938. The period from 1929 to 1932 is characterized by the Great Depression and banking panics. In comparison, the period from 1934, when deposit insurance was enacted, until the current crisis, is known as the "Quiet Period" in U.S. banking (Gorton, 2010) . A banking panic occurs when information-insensitive debt becomes information-sensitive. In other words, depositors intensify monitoring Our general approach is to compare the behavior of preferred and regular depositors within a bank before and after the introduction of deposit insurance. The preponderance of the banks that we study were unit institutions, located in a single building. Some of the larger banks possessed branches, but by law, all of these branches operated within the same municipality as the headquarters. We control for bank and municipality fixed effects. Our within bank approach, therefore, controls for the substantial changes in the structure of the financial industry during the 1930s and the wide range of factors -observable and unobservable -that impacted depositors in each institution but did not differentially impact regular and preferred depositors.
The remainder of this essay describes our analysis. Section 2 establishes the historical foundations of our estimation strategy. It is based on the unique structure of New York's commercial banking system and the adoption of deposit insurance in the United States, one of the first and largest institutional changes of this type. Section 3 describes the data set that we examine for this study, which includes the balance sheets of all state-chartered banks and trust companies in New York from 1929 through 1938. Section 4 presents a model of depositor behavior which informs our statistical analysis.
Section 5 presents our statistical methods and empirical results. We focus on two types of information two which depositors typically react. The first is information about economic conditions, which informs depositors about the risks of depositing in banks and the opportunity cost of doing so. The second is information specific to individual banks, such as information about their balance sheets, which reveals information about banks' health and the benefits of the health of their banks. However, deposit insurance made deposits information-insensitive debt. By comparing depositors' responses to bank risk before and after deposit insurance, we identify how deposit insurance influenced depositor monitoring.
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possessing a relationship with an institution in the future. We assess depositors' reactions to both types of information.
Our assessment requires us to overcome a key threat to inference: endogeneity. Both types of information that we examine arise, in part, through decisions of depositors. The most widely reported information about the state of the economy, such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average, arose from financial markets in New York City. Prices in those markets reacted to flows of deposits in and out banks in Manhattan, because commercial banks in the Big Apple invested a substantial share of their resources in call money markets, which funded purchases of stocks and bonds. The impact of this information, therefore, can be accurately assess only for banks outside of New York City; so this portion of our analysis excludes banks in all boroughs of the city.
Information about banks' balance sheets also depended on the collective choices of depositors. This is particularly true of the balance-sheet ratios that depositors typically monitored, such as (in today's terminology) measures of banks' liquidity and leverage. In the cash to deposits ratio, for example, the denominator is total deposits, which is obviously a function of depositors' decisions, and the numerator is cash, which also depended directly and indirectly on depositors' choices. Withdrawals directly reduced cash on hand in the bank, while managers' anticipation of withdrawals induced them to change the level of cash holdings. We control for endogeneity of this type using prevalent solution in the literature: lag and functional form restrictions that separate how ratios reacted to depositors' decisions from how depositors reacted to changes in ratios. The structure of our data provides an obvious lag structure.
Depositors received information about banks' balance sheets with a lag of several weeks after the end of a fiscal quarter, when financial institutions published their quarterly reports in local 5 newspapers. We incorporate this timing into our estimates by assuming that depositors reacted only to information available to the public. Section 6 discusses the limitations and implications of our estimates. Our results show that deposit insurance reduced, but did not eliminate, depositor monitoring. Before the creation of the FDIC, regular depositors reacted more than preferred depositors to information about bank balance sheets and economic aggregates. After the creation of the FDIC, regular and preferred depositors reacted similarly to information about banks' balance sheets. In other words, regular depositors' reactions to information about aggregate economic conditions diminished, but did not entirely disappear.
Historical Background
Our empirical research rests upon factual foundations. This section summarizes the essential information. It focuses on three topics. The first is the structure of the commercial banking system in the state of New York, which shaped depositors' incentives to monitor banks.
The second is depositors' ability to obtain and process information, which shaped the ways in which they could monitor the safety and soundness of deposits. The third is reforms of the commercial banking system during the 1930s, principally the creation of deposit insurance, which influenced depositors' incentives to monitor financial institutions.
In New York during the 1920s and 1930s, hundreds of commercial banks operated under state charters. Almost all of these banks operated as unit institutions, under a single charter, within a single building, and summarizing their activities with a single balance sheet. Unit banks' depositors typically resided within a short distance, most less than 20 miles, of the bank. Most loans were made to borrowers within a similar radius. A small number of banks operated 6 branches, which according to state law, had to operate within the same municipality as their headquarters. For these branch networks, corporate balance sheets summed the assets and liabilities of the headquarters and branches. A small number of banks in Manhattan also operated within holding corporations. Holding corporations typically owned multiple institutions. A common structure included a commercial bank, an investment bank, a trust company, and sometimes a building-and-loan or an insurance corporation. This essay analyzes the commercial banking component of each holding corporation.
New York City possessed a special position in the banking hierarchy of the United States.
New York was a central reserve city. Banking law required banks in a central reserve city to hold 13 percent of net demand deposits as reserves. The banks held these reserves either as cash in their vaults or, for member banks, as deposits at the Fed. Albany and Buffalo were reserve cities.
Banks in reserve cities had to hold 10 percent of deposits as reserves, but could hold those reserves either as cash in their vaults, deposits at the Fed, or deposits in banks in central reserve cities. Banks outside of reserve cities were collectively called country banks. These banks had to hold 7 percent of net demand deposits as reserves, and could hold those reserves either as cash in their vault or deposits in banks in reserve or central reserve cities.
2 These legal-reserve requirements reinforced and reflected a reserve pyramid in which country banks around the To ensure that we examine the evidence with these limitations in mind, we focus our analysis on quantitative methods popularized by Banker's Magazine (1927) during the 1920s and Garcia's (1935) How to Analyze a Bank Statement in the 1930s. These sources described how depositors, investors, and other interested analysts could assess the health of banks' balance sheets. Signs of bank health included steady increases in equity, measured by paid-up capital, surplus, and retained earnings; diversified portfolios, including cash, bonds, and loans; and consistent payments of interest and dividends. The sources also taught the public how to conduct simple ratio analysis. These sources taught readers to calculate useful ratios. Examples include equity ratio, which equaled paid-up capital plus retained earnings divided by total assets, and which Garcia explains as indicative of the "leverage" of the institution (1935)Another was the cash ratio, which equaled cash, cash items, and reserves deposited at other banks divided by total deposits. A third was the ratio of collateralized or otherwise secured loans to total assets. The sources told depositors to compare these ratios to past measures for the same bank and average ratios for all banks. All editions of Garcia's book, which was published from the 1930s through the 1980s, contained a table indicating average ratios for banks in different regions, states, and reserve cities. Safer banks had higher capital ratios and similar liquidity to comparable institutions. In good times, the typical cash ratio approached the minimum required by law. The typical bank, in other words, held little or no excess reserves. During the 1920s and early 1930s, when liquidity was abundant and the Federal Reserve System trusted (or perhaps untested) as a lender of last resort, holding substantial excess reserves could be seen as a sign of weakness, since it signaled that a bank did not believe it could turn to counterparties or the Federal Reserve for loans, should it need to convert assets to cash in order to accommodate depositors' demands.
Depositors also possessed information about the state of the economy. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) was one of the most widely reported statistics. It appeared every day in newspapers throughout New York (and the rest of the United States). The DJIA was one of the first and certainly the most widely watched and most influential barometer of business activity.
Large movements in the DJIA were typically highlighted on newspapers' front pages and by newspapers' street signs and salesmen. Large movements in the DJIA also generated discussion on radio news shows, which commanded growing audiences during the 1930s. At that time, of course, individuals had access to much less information about the state of the economy than individuals due today. The government and private businesses collected and published far less data. Quantitative analysis of financial and economic data was in its infancy. Neither the Internet nor electronic spread sheets existed. Typical depositors at typical banks tended to focus on summary statistics which were widely reported. The most widely reported statistic was the DJIA.
Our paper employs three additional types of data to control for economic conditions. The The Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 changed the financial system in many ways. For our study, the most important changes were those that differentially influenced the incentives of preferred versus regular depositors. Insurance was a transcendent change. Prior to its existence, incentives of preferred and regular depositors differed, with regular depositors exposed to greater risk. After deposit insurance, incentives converged, with both classes of depositors promised rapid access to funds held by failing banks. Rules regarding interest payments on deposits worked in the same direction. Before 1935, rates paid to preferred and regular depositors differed. Afterwards, these rates converged, with the interest rates on demand deposits set near zero and interest rates on time and savings deposits capped at six percent.
Data Sources and Summary Statistics
Data for this study come from several sources. The principal data consists of quarterly level balance sheets for all state-chartered commercial banks and trust companies in New York
State. This information was published in the Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks. We computerized this data for the years relevant for our study, and our working to computerize the data series for all years from 1913 through 1938.
Newly constructed balance sheet information possesses many advantages. It is accurate, since it comes from legal submissions whose veracity checked by independent auditors and bank examiners. Incorrect submissions exposed corporate officers to civil and criminal liability. This information was also widely disseminated, since state law required banks to publish these balance sheets in local newspapers. The bank superintendent published all of this information in monthly bulletins and in an annual report published early in the following year (i.e. 1912 data appeared in print in early 1913). The report presented this data in a consistent format for several decades.
The data also present certain challenges. One challenge comes from the evolving categorization of liabilities and assets across the years that we study. In some years, for example, the source reports liabilities tabulated by class of depositor and type of deposit. In other years, the source does not contain this cross tabulation. We overcome this challenge by computing consistent categories across all years at the finest possible categorization. Another challenge comes from a lacuna in the data. Most of these deposits were concentrated in New York City. Figure 3 presents the share of deposits in New York's state-charted banking system by reserve city status. New York City banks represented only 19 percent of banks, but 70 percent of deposits. Reserve city and country banks represent 10 and 20 percent of deposits, respectively. Throughout our analysis, we will provide separate estimation results for New York City bank and for country banks since we find important differences in depositor monitoring of these two categories of banks.
In order to identify causality between deposit insurance and depositor monitoring, we use deposit insurance as a natural experiment that reduced the risk of holding regular deposits after 1935. We begin our analysis by plotting the movement of regular and preferred deposits before and after deposit insurance. Figure 4 , Panel A, shows that regular deposits constituted most of total deposits. Regular and preferred deposits represented 90 percent and 10 percent of total deposits, respectively. Figure 4 , Panel B illustrates deposit indices for regular and preferred deposits. While regular deposits declined and preferred deposits increased before deposit insurance, it is unclear that both types of deposits followed different trajectories after deposit insurance.
We present the mean values and standard deviation for all variables used in the analysis in Table 3 . The descriptive statistics are calculated separately for the periods before and after the introduction of deposit insurance. We observe that while regular deposits contracted, preferred deposits expanded before the introduction of deposit insurance. In comparison, while regular deposits expanded, preferred deposits contracted after the introduction of deposit insurance. As a result, a share of preferred deposits increased from 0.7 to 0.11. The cash-deposit ratio rose from 
Model
Our empirical approach begins with a model of why economic agents deposited funds in commercial banks during the era which we investigate. Depositors' primary motivation was acquiring transaction services. The principal service was the ability to use checks as a means of payment. Secondary services included safekeeping of cash, wire transfers, letters of credit, certified checks, access to seasonal lines of credit, and convenient foreign exchange. Interest was paid on demand deposits, which were the majority of deposits held by commercial banks.
Savings accounts paid slightly higher rates of interest, and could be used for transaction services by transferring funds between savings and demand accounts. At the time, commercial banks were the only financial institutions that offered these services -the legal, contractual, and technological innovations that enabled other institutions to compete on this dimension did not occur until after World War 2, and largely during the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, the principal alternative to using commercial banks for transactions services was to hold large quantities of cash.
Given (1-pjt). 6 Substituting for B and L in (1), we see that depositors determined the fraction of their funds to deposit in their bank by weighing the expected benefits of two states of the world: one state in which the bank remained in operation and provided transaction services; the other in 6 Note that since we are focusing on demand deposits, which individuals can withdraw at any time, individuals based their decisions on the interest rate they earn in the current period. Since we are focusing on transaction accounts, the alternative investment is holding currency (or a close substitute for currency, such as gold coins or perhaps postal-savings deposits, a safe forming of savings that pays minimal interest and provides few services). For these reasons, our model abstracts from the term structure of interest rates and returns on alternative forms of invest. Later, we'll discuss how these could be added to the model, but why they would not change our results. Throughout our analysis, we normalize the costs and benefits of holding cash, which was depositors principal alternative, to zero.
20
which the bank ceased operations and the depositor received the liquidation value of their deposit, as in equation (2) below.
To determine total deposits in each bank, we need to sum the balances of the depositors.
Then, we can write total deposits in a bank, Djt, as follows.
Here, Fjt indicates total transaction funds available to all depositors in bank j at time t. If we assume that all depositors are identical, then we can write (3) as follows.
Our empirical estimates focus on deposits aggregated at the bank level, because we observe total deposits in each bank, not the balances of particular depositors.
We also observe banks' allocation of assets. Depositors observed this information, and in many cases, considered it when deciding the fraction of their transaction balances to place in their banks. For this section, we represent a bank's choice with a single variable, x, which indicates the fraction of a bank's assets placed into lucrative but risky asset, such as a loan to a local business. The variable xjt lies between zero and one. Assume a bank holds all resources other than loans in a safe, liquid, low-return asset, such as cash in its vault. A bank's portfolio decisions influence the interest that it pays to depositors, its probability of failure, and the liquidation value of its deposits. Taking this information into account allows us to rewrite our depositor-decision equation as follows. 7 Note that we'll assume depositors in failed banks have access to the liquidation value of their deposits during the quarter in which the bank failed. 8 The concept of depositor monitoring means that depositors react to banks' choices -particularly about how to invest the funds with which they are entrusted -which influence the costs and benefits of deposits. Our model incorporates this concept by adding a variable, x, which represents the banks' choice (or choices). For now, think of x as a single decision, a banks' choice of what percentage of its balance sheet to invest in a safe, liquid asset (e.g.
(5) = * ( ( ( ), ) ( ), ( )(1 − ( )))
To determine how aggregate deposits responded to banks' portfolio choices, we take the derivative of both sides of (5) with respect to xjt.
(6) / = * ( ( ( ), ) ( ), ( )(1− ( )))
Simplifying and collecting terms yields an equation with a clear interpretation.
The derivative on the right-hand side contains three terms. The first term, ( ), refers to the change in benefits that a depositor receives when a bank changes interest rates on demand deposits (multiplied by the probability of receiving interest payments). The second term, ( ( ( ), ) − ( )) , refers to the net benefit of depositing in a healthy bank rather than receiving the liquidation value of one's deposits multiplied by the change in the likelihood of the banks' survival (due to the changing riskiness of the bank's portfolio). The third term,
(1 − ( )) , refers to the change in liquidation value of the bank's portfolio (due to the changing riskiness of the bank's portfolio) multiplied by the probability of the bank failing.
Economic factors determine the endpoints of the r(x) and p(x) functions. If a bank holds
all of its assets as cash, then it earns no returns, cannot pay interest to depositors, cannot recoup its costs, and eventually fails. If a bank holds no liquid assets, then it may be able to pay high interest for a while, but eventually the illiquid institution faces a credit crunch, when depositors wish to withdraw funds and the bank lacks the ability to repay, and the bank goes out of cash in its vault or deposits at the Federal Reserve) versus what percentage to invest in riskier higher-return assets (e.g. mortgage loans). Therefore, x is a fraction whose domain lies between zero and one (later, we generalize x to a vector of variables that can lie either between zero and one or along the real line). A bank's choice may influence the probability of default or the interest paid to depositors. Therefore, both r, p, and D are functions of x.
business. So, the optimal level of x lies in the interior of the (0,1) interval. Between those endpoints, the shapes of the functions are unknown.
The functions' optimal points and even their shapes may vary over time, as the state of the economy and attitudes of individuals vary. For example, during a long period of prosperity, banks with above average x may earn larger profits, pay higher dividends, and have lower rates of failure. Following a financial panic, however, banks with above average x may suffer substantial investment losses, which could force them into insolvency. The shapes of the r(x) and p(x) functions may also depend upon strategic interactions in financial markets. The probability of failure, p(x), for example, depends upon depositors' perceptions of mindset of short-term creditors (such as other depositors or correspondent bankers), who could withdraw funds en masse, forcing an illiquid institution out of business.
Equations (4) through (7) highlight key issues in empirical studies of depositors' behavior. We observe deposits, D, at the aggregate but not the individual level. We observe few of the variables or functions on the right-hand side of the equation. At times, ex-post returns, r, can be estimated by dividing total interest paid during a period by average daily deposits during that same interval, but this information is available infrequently, and estimated average yields may be far from the marginal returns earned by particular depositors. The ex-post probability of default can be estimated from the failure rate of commercial banks, but depositors' ex-ante expectations of the probability of default cannot be unobserved. Equation (7), which is the derivative of (5) with respect to xjt, highlights other issues that complicate attempts to determine how depositors react to banks' actions. Economic theory places little or no restrictions on the shapes or slopes of the functions on the right-hand side of (7). Not surprisingly, the literature on this topic reports empirical estimates of these coefficients
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(or of the aggregate relationship between x and D) with various signs, magnitudes, and significance levels. The coefficients often vary over time. All of these estimates could be correct. They usually seem consistent with sensible interpretations of the situation -like during booms depositors shift towards higher-risk higher-return institutions, so that D/dx is positive, while following financial crises, depositors shift their funds towards institutions with less exposure and more liquidity, so that D/dx is negative.
Equation (7) above summarizes the responses of regular depositors. The equation simplifies for preferred depositors for several reasons. First, state law set rates of interest for preferred depositors. For them, therefore, dr/dx equaled zero, and hence the first term on the right-hand side of (7) equaled zero. Second, in the good state of the world in which their bank continued to operated, preferred depositors received lower interest rates and identical services to regular depositors. In contrast in the bad state of the world, preferred depositors were better off than regular depositors (as described in the next paragraph). Thus, the second term in equation (7), which was a function of the difference between the good and bad states for a depositor, was lower for preferred than regular depositors.
Third, state law ensured that preferred depositors received complete repayment before regular depositors received any repayment. Historically, preferred depositors in New York state banks experienced no legal losses, although bank failures occasionally caused them economic inconvenience, because it trapped their deposits in institutions undergoing liquidation, and prevented them from accessing their cash until the liquidating agent, either the Superintendent of Banks or court-authorized receiver, collected sufficient funds to pay of preferred claims, which occasionally took time. In the instances which the authors' examined, liquidators typically began paying preferred depositors within a few months and finished the payouts within one year.
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Preferred depositors appear to have been able to borrow on their claims. Their economic losses due to the temporary illiquidity were limited. Payouts to regular depositors began after preferred depositors and extended for several years. Regular depositors incurred losses in all cases, ranging from a few cents on the dollar to half of the amount due. If a bank increased the amount that it invested in risky assets, all (or almost all) of the addition risk would be born by regular depositors. The last term in in equation (7) was, therefore, equal to 0 (or was very close to it).
Substituting these three conditions into equation (7), we derive the equivalent equation for preferred depositors.
Comparing equations (7) and (8) on checking deposits at zero, and capped the interest rate on savings accounts at a low level.
Equations (7) and (8) Equations (7) and (8) help us to understand the impact of deposit insurance on depositors'
decisions. Before we bring them to the data, we need to discuss additional issues that arise during empirical implementation.
One issue is that our model makes predictions about interest rates, as well as the quantities of deposits. In our empirical analysis, we focus on movements in quantities, which we observe in the data. Another issue is that in the model, we assume that depositors allocate funds to a single type of deposits or to cash in their pocket. We assume that depositors neither shift funds from one bank to another nor do they shift funds from regular to preferred deposits in response to bankers' investment decisions. In the real world, of course, depositors may have (and probably did) some of both. We lack information on these choices, because we only observe deposits by type at the bank level. We'll discuss how these issues influence our estimates in the empirical section below.
Our model also simplified bankers' portfolio and leverage decisions. We simplified these into a simple choice of investing all funds in either a safe or risky asset. In the real world, bankers make a set of simultaneous decisions about the liability and asset sides of their balance sheets. Bankers determine how much of their own much to invest in the institution and how much to leverage their investment with depositors' funds. Bankers invest their resources in an array of assets, some with higher risks and returns, some safer and more liquid. On these issues, our shift from theory to estimation relies on Garcia's (1935) and Bankers' Magazine's (1928) volumes that introduced the public to the ratio analysis of bank balance sheets. These books told depositors to focus on banks' decisions about leverage, cash, and asset quality. For leverage, both sources recommended examining the ratio of owners' equity to borrowed funds (or to total assets). A higher ratio meant that owners had more skin in the game, a bank was less likely to fail, and if it did go out of business, depositors would see higher recoveries. For liquidity, both sources recommended examining a ratio of cash (or cash-like assets) to deposits (or to total assets). The comparison should be made to the typical amount of liquidity held by comparable banks, and both sources provided tables, which indicated recent ratios for banks in prominent locations. Deviations from the norm (either high or low) were deemed undesirable. Banks with less liquidity than normal may not be able to meet depositors needs. Banks with more liquidity than normal might have inside information about upcoming shocks or fear that that their assets might not be accepted as collateral from correspondents or the Federal Reserve.
Empirical Methods and Results
Our empirical analysis asks two related questions. First, how did preferred and regular depositors' reactions to information about banks' balance sheets change after the introduction of deposit insurance? Second, how did preferred and regular depositors' reactions to information about the state of the economy change after the introduction of deposit insurance? We answer these questions sequentially, because answering each question involves overcoming a problem of endogeneity. The solution to endogeneity in the first case prevents us from answering the second question; while the solution to endogeneity in the latter case prevents us from answering the former 27
To measure depositors' reaction to information about banks' balance sheets, we estimate the following panel regression. The vector F t-1 indicates bank balance sheet factors. This vector of bank-level ratios reflects banks' leverage, liquidity, and in some specifications, asset quality. We represent leverage with the ratio of owners' book equity to total assets. This ratio is typically termed the capital ratio. Book equity is the sum of paid-up capital, surplus, and other retained earnings. We represent liquidity with the ratio of excess reserves to total deposits. We use the ratio of excess reserves to deposits, rather than cash assets to deposits, because required reserves varied depending on the city in which a bank was located and membership in the Federal Reserve System. Excess reserves are calculated by subtracting required reserves from total reserves, giving a clear indication the funds that banks could quickly mobilize to pay depositors. Reserves are the sum of cash items, cash on hand, and funds due from banks (including the Federal Reserve). Required reserves are a fraction of time and demand deposits which varies depending upon the city in which the bank operated. Asset quality is measured by a ratio of secured loans to total loans.
We lag these bank balance-sheet ratios to reflect the fact that the public received balancesheet information with a lag and to reduce potential endogeneity problems. The lag ensures that
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only exogenous information appears on the right-hand side of the equation. β F is the vector of coefficients for the variables in F. βkc F are the coefficients corresponding to the intercept and interaction terms for regular deposits, after FDIC, and regular/after FDIC respectively.
An indicator variable for each time period, λt, controls for time-varying economic factors.
These time-fixed effects ensure that we control for all time-varying factors, even those which we do not observe. To control for heterogeneity at the bank level, we include a fixed effect for each bank. We also cluster error terms at the bank, depositor level, μkj.. The random error term is εjkt.
The results from our regressions appear in Table 4 . All columns include time fixed effects. The second and forth columns include controls for loan quality. The third and fourth columns include bank fixed effects. Our main interest is the vector of coefficients β11 F and the sum of the coefficients β11 F plus β10 F . The former indicate whether deposit insurance altered the incentives of regular relative to preferred depositors. The latter indicates whether deposit insurance caused the behavior of regular and preferred depositors to converge.
The first row presents the coefficient indicating regular depositors' response to deposit insurance (β11 , excess reserves). In all cases, the null hypothesis that it equaled zero can be rejected.
This indicates that deposit insurance changed the behavior of regular depositors. In all cases, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients in the first and third rows (i.e. Now, we turn to capital. The fifth row presents the coefficient indicating how regular depositors responded to capital-ratio changed after the introduction of deposit insurance (β11 , capital ratio ). In all models, the null hypothesis that the coefficient equaled zero can be rejected.
Deposit insurance, in other words, changed how regular depositors responded to information about capital ratios. We also cannot reject the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients in the fifth and seventh rows (i.e. β11 , capital ratio + β10 , capital ratio ) equals zero. That indicates that the behavior of regular depositors converged with the behavior of preferred depositors after the introduction of deposit insurance. The coefficients in the sixth and eighth rows reveal the baseline behavior for preferred depositors. Before the creation of the FDIC, preferred depositors did not react to information about the capital ratio. Afterwards, they did. Why preferred depositors became more sensitive to bank risk later in the depression is difficult to determine.
The result could be consistent with a wake-up call effect that depositors may experience in the aftermath of a banking crisis. Karas, Pyle, and Schoors (2013) report similar results. They find a 30 numbing effect from deposit insurance and a wake-up call from financial crises. In their study, these effects cancel each other out in the long run.
Our results appear to be robust to changes in the specifications described above. Similar results arise from regressions using different definitions of liquidity, such as total (rather than excess) reserves, or the ratio of quick assets (cash, due from banks, and government bonds) to demand deposits. Similar results also arise using different definitions of capital and leverage.
Overall, we find that after the creation of the FDIC, depositors ceased to respond to and a lagging indicator (number of business failures). These variables reflect economic forces that effected the supply and demand of deposits, rather than information that depositors possessed, because these data were constructed with a lag of many months and were seldom disseminated directly to ordinary individuals. β X is the vector of coefficients for the variables in X. βkc X are the coefficients corresponding to the intercept and interaction terms for regular deposits, after FDIC, and regular-after FDIC respectively.
The vector F t-1 indicates bank balance sheet factors. These include the ratio of unsecured loans to total loans, the ratio of excess reserves to total deposits, the ratio of capital to total assets, and the log of total assets. β F is the vector of coefficients for the variables in F. βkc F are the coefficients corresponding to the intercept and interaction terms for regular deposits, after FDIC, and regular-after FDIC respectively. Table 5 indicates the results of these regressions for banks outside of New York City.
Column (1) presents a baseline. Columns (2) and (3) add controls for economic conditions.
Columns (3) adds controls for balance-sheet characteristics. These regressions show that before the introduction of deposit insurance, deposits fluctuated in response to information about the 33 DJIA, even when controlling for economic factors and bank characteristics. Preferred deposits served as a safe haven. When the DJIA rose, regular deposits rose and preferred deposits fell.
When the DJIA fell, the opposite happened. Preferred deposits expanded, and regular deposits contracted.
Our key coefficient, β11A, which indicates how the response of regular depositors to the FDIC differed from the response of preferred depositors, is negative and statistically significant.
It indicates that the introduction of deposit insurance reduced the response of regular deposits to news about the DJIA relative to the response of preferred depositors. The coefficient β11A has a causal interpretation. It demonstrates how the response of the treated group, in this case regular depositors, differed from the response of the untreated group, preferred depositors.
Discussion
This essay examines the impact of the world's first and largest nationwide depositinsurance system. In 1935, after two years of tinkering with emergency expedients, the United 1929 to 1932 and 1935 through 1938 . The dependent variable is the first differenced natural logarithm of bank deposits. k is an indicator that equals 1 for regular deposits. c is an indicator that equals one after the establishment of the FDIC. Controls for loan quality include the ratio of unsecured to all loans and its interactions with k, c, and kc. 
